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Tina Dolidze (Tbilisi) 
THE LOGIC OF LANGUAGE IN GREGORY OF NYSSA'S 
TREATISE "AGAINST EUNOMIUS"· 
Anyone who has an interest in Gregory of Nyssa's conception of the logic of 
language must make an in-depth study of his "Contra Eunomium". The 
logically refined dogmatic discourses, found in this work, contain many 
significant statements about the nature of language and its functioning. They 
may be represented as comprehensive theory, although it is not a goal that the 
author of these books sets for himself: the technical equipment of theory 
could not serve with profit the main purpose of this work - defence of the 
divine truth about the Holy Trinity.1 
Since Gregory of Nyssa does not tend to reflect in a systematic way, this 
causes some difficulties for the modern reader, who is much disposed to 
• The paper of the conference. 
1 Cf. Contra Eunomium (CE) II, 580: 378, 11 . See for the quotations: Gregorii Nysseni opera, 
Contra Eunomium libri, ed. V. Jaeger, pars I (liber I et 11) Beroloni 1921; pars Il (liber III; 
Refutatio confessionis Eunomii), Beroloni 1921 . St. Gregory is ready to leave the fonnal 
classification of names and phrases to them, who are scientifically ambitious. In regard to his 
own aim, he says: "we investigate the, thought alone, whether it is within or beyond the circle of 
pious and appropriate conception {01t<>ATJ\fl;) of God". That the theory created in this way has a 
long path of cultural reception, is justified at any rate by the fact that this theory influenced 
linguistic speculations of the times of humanism. This is well shown in Theo Kobusch's brief, 
but rich survey with the following treatement of the problem: "1st Gregor von Nyssa also der 
erste chrisliche AufkHirer? Jedenfalls kann nur dann, wenn der Zusammenhang zwischen der 
Position des Nysseners und der Position der AufkHlrung berOcksichtigt wird, auch der 
Grundgedanke moderner Sprachphilosophie in seiner historischen Wahrheit erkannt werden: Er 
ist die spate Folge einer spezifisch christlichen Idee, nach der die menschliche Vernunft und 
das, was sie in Freiheit hervorbringt, in ihrer eigenen Wilrde anerkannt ist und auch als voil Gott 
anerkannt gewuBt wird" (Th.Kobusch. Name und Sein. Zu den sprachphilosophischen 
Grundlagen in der Schrift Contra Eunomium des Gregor von Nyssa: El "Contra Eunomium I" 
En la produccion literaria de Gregorio de Nisa {VI Coloquio Internacional sobre Gregorio de 
Nisa), ed. L.F.Mateo Seco y J.L.Bastero, Pamplona 1988, 247. 247-268. 
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schematize; he strives to classify closely interdependent topics in order to 
make them clear in an analytical mode. 
This is also the approach used in the present paper. 
1. The common characteristics of discursive language 
Recalling the historical situation in which Nyssa's conception of language 
was created, I would limit myself to a brief comment on the frequently 
considered problem: St. Gregory's theory as a matter of fact arose from the 
dogmatic polemic around God's one attribute - ungenerated ( aytvvrrroc;) and 
was formed as an alternative to the Neo-arian view on the names given by 
God. 2 This fact must be taken into consideration since it explains the 
specificity of Nyssa's theory - its centrifugal trend to one term. 
In the case of the Cappadocians and their Neo-arian opponent two 
different semiotic models must be distinguished. Eunomius divides all names 
by their origin and cognitive value into those that are created by human 
reason and those of Divine origin; the former type of names has no chance to 
grasp reality, whereas the latter is believed to contain the substance of a thing 
in utterance. 3 To criticize this rather simplified semiotic structure Basil ~nd 
Gregory of Nyssa apply the three components' structure theory, found in Plato 
and entirely formed by Aristotle and the Stoics. It distinguishes between a 
thing, human thought and the significant linguistic expression.4 Any 
significant name for the Cappadocians is a product of man's reasoning. It has 
no independent existence, but exists through ontological and mental entities, 
expressing some movement of thought, which is directed to the knowledge or 
contemplation of some reality.5 In the controversy with Eunomius, Basil and 
Gregory develop the theory of btivota (conception), using a term already 
well known from the Stoic theory of knowledge.6 In his dogmatic discourse 
2 To show the priority of this term for Eunomius and his followers was very important since 
through it they could assert, that "generated" is not an appropriate name of God; hence all other 
attributes of the Son would be ascribed only to the Father. Because of that the nomination is one 
of the main dogmatic topics in Gregory. Mateo Seco rightly calls it "nucleo intimo del suo 
pensiero". See L. F. Mateo Seco. Cristologia e linguaggio in Gregorio di Nissa, in: Lingua e 
teologia nel cristianesimo greco (Atti del convegno tenuto a Trento I' 11 -12 dicembre 1997), a 
cura di C.Moreschini e G. Menestrina, Brescia 1999, 23 1. 
3 
Basil., Adv. Eun. 520C (MPG 29). Cf. with the view of Cratylus in the dialogue of Plato (Crat. 
429b), who called name only the correct name and asserted that "whoever knows the names 
knows the things" (435d). 
4 
Basil., Adv. Eun. 520C ff. Gr. Nyss., CE II, 572: 393, 14; CE I, 539: 182, 22. 
5 
Cf. Basil. , Adv. Eun. 520C-52 1C; 524 BC; CE II, 125: 25 1, 14; II, 589: 380, 32; II, 572: 393,14 
ff. ; I , 539: 182, 22; II, 150: 257,23; Ill, V, 60: 172, 17-18. 
6 
Basil. , Adv. Eun. 520C-521 C. CE II , 44-50: 228, l 6-230, 3 ; II, 179-193: 264, 23-268, 27. Cf. 
Gr. Naz., Or. 29, 13 (Gregor von Nazianz. Die ftinf theologischen Reden, hrsg. von J.Barbel, 
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with Basil, Eunomius employs the word to denote the exercize of a 
groundless imagination. In his opinion ayEVVll·toc;, which signifies the nature 
of God, cannot arise in any way from such a low faculty as man's bcivota.7 As 
a matter of fact Eunomius emphasizes only one aspect of the term's 
semantics, as it had in the philosophical and theological usage of his time.8 
The Cappadocians on their part apply to the same ambigous notion with 
special intention, for it corresponds well to their doctrine of the sovereignty of 
human nature and its reasoning. According to Basil's view, shared by 
Gregory, the conception is such an ability of human reason which follows 
sensory experience, is able to analyse and abstract its objects, not only invent 
them as mere fancies. Both Cappadocians attach high cultural significance to 
human brivota. It is the basis of sciences and arts and all other benefits that 
has been discovered for the service of human life. The object of its inquiry 
DUsseldorf 1963, 150). In the Cappadocian theology £1tivota is a parallel tenn to 8tcivota, 
voT)crtc;, v611µa , Ka'taA'l'l'tc;, KO'taA.1rttlCT) 8icivoia, u1t0AT)\jll<;. As attests G.C. Stead (Logic and 
the application of names to God (El "Contra Eunomium I " En la produccion literaria de 
Gregorio de Nisa (VI Coloquio Internacional sobre Gregorio de Nisa), ed. L.F.Mateo Seco y 
J.L.Bastero, Pamplona 1988, 311) the treating oflmivota in Philo has prepared the way for the 
theological application of the term. 
About the Stoic origin of the Epinoia - theory in Gregory of Nyssa and the Epicurean 
interpretation of it by Eunomius see Th.Kobusch, op. cit. , 253-254; cf. G.C.Stead, op. c it. , 309-
311. 
7 Basil. , Adv. Eun. 520 C; Greg. Nyss., CE II, 125ff.: 251 , 9 ff. Gregory in general remarks 
concerning Eunomius that the reason for his incorrect theory of language was his misreading of 
the "Cratylus" of Plato (cf. CE II, 404: 329, 23). J. Danielou discerns in Eunomius' mystical 
interpretation of language the influence of the Neoplatonic commentaries on the "Cratylus"; at 
the same time he suggests that Origen also must have influenced the Neo-arian's mystical 
attitude to language as well as his interpretation ofE1tiv~ta (see J. Danielou, Eunome I' arien et 
l'exegese neo-platonicienne du Cratyle, in : Revue des Etudes Grecques, t. LXIX, Paris 1956, 
412-432, see 417-418, 422-424, 427). This idea, as important as it is, needs substantial revision 
on both points, as long as in the case of both Neoplatonists and Origen Eunomius' dipartite 
semiotic division is compared with the tripartite one. The tripartite semiotic model in the fonn 
of definition one can find in the Peripatetic and Neoplatonic commentaries on the "Categories11 
of Aristotle. See Alex. of Aegae apud. Simpl. 10, 19; Alex. Aphr. apud Simpl. 10, 10; Iambi. 
apud Simpl. 13, 11 (Simplicii in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium, ed. C.Kalbfleisch, in: 
Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca (CAG), v.VIII, Beroloni 1907); Porph. in Cat. 56, 36; 59, 
20; 115, 25 (Porphyrii Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium, ed. Ad. Busse, CAG, 
v.IV, p. I, Berolini I 887); Dex. 10, 26 (Dexippi in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium, ed 
A.Busse, CAG, v. IV, p. II, Berolini 1888). For Origen see - Orig., in Jo. IV, 1 (ex Philoc.), 98. 
1-6; I, 28. 36, 25 ; VI, 41. 151 , 3; II, 9. 63, 2lff; II, 12. 67, 30; XIX, 5. 303, 14ff. (Origenes. 
Werke. B. IV. Der Johanneskommentar, hrsg. v. E. Preuschen: Die griechischen Christlichen 
Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte (GCS), Leipzig 1903). 
8 See btivoia as <Stcivota, v611crtc;, u1tovota in Plot. , Enn. II, 9,1, 26; II, 9, 17, 5; VI, 6, 3, 27; 
Porph., Sent. 46, 13; 48,7; 53, 7-8;21. (ed. E. Lamberz, Lzg. 1975); in Cat. 73, 7; 90, 15; Dex., 
in Cat. IO, 11 ; 12, 14. 15. (ed. R. Bentler, W. Theiler, Hamburg 1967). 
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may also be the transcendent First Principle about whom the conception may 
reveal the true predicates by a logical sequence of thought.9 
Gregory considers two realms of the functioning of enivota according to 
the dichotomic division of worlds into the sensible and intelligible. The world 
of senses may be defined as a realm of knowledge (yvrocnc;), because on 
account of perception the judgement of sensible phaenomena creates per se 
no occasion for a false opinion about the things discussed. As to the 
intelligible world, human reasoning can find there no obvious ground which 
could ensure comprehension of the object of study, but the process of 
discovery develops within the limits of probability, surmising something 
about the sublime object of thought. 10 Gregory of Nyssa explains the 
transition of our mind from yvrocn~ to u1t6A:r1'Vt~ (also un6vota) in the 
intelligible realm on the basis of his well known ontological doctrine of the 
infinity of God, as opposed to the finite creative existence. The cognitive 
status of language in this ontological structure is quite clear: belonging as it 
does to the finite order of being, language is unable to express the knowledge 
of infinite God, since it is impossible to grasp the nature of infinity in the 
finite words.11 When man's thought turns to the transcendent realm two 
occurrences may arise: it may happen that the thought hits the object of 
investigation and the appropriate utterance interprets it, but may be that there 
are also two-fold hindrances on this path; failure in both - comprehending 
and interpreting capacity, or in one of them. In this case, Gregory believes, it 
is more important to reach the true thought even though the word itself may 
happen to be less appropriate to it. 12 Following Plato's Seventh letter he 
explains the reason of this theoretical alternative: in the realm which is 
beyond human knowledge the possibility of enunciation is more removed 
from truth than human reasoning is.13 It seems that St. Gregory considers 
reasoning and linguistic expression to be of different origin: God is the 
9 See CE II, 180-190: 265, 2-268, 19; II, 147: 256, 27; Basil., Adv. Eun. 524 D - 525C. 
1° CE I, 365-369: 128, 18-129, 25 . 
11 CE II, 69: 235, 22; I, I 69: 73, 3; I, 6 I 9: 196, 1. cf. Basil., Adv. Eun. 533 C, 541 C. 
Gregory compares a man, who tries to express in language the Divine nature with one, who 
believes that he can enclose the whole sea in his own hand. "for as the hollow of one's hand to 
the whole deep, so is all the power of language in comparison with that Nature which is 
unspeakable and incomprehensible." Cf. Gregory of Nyssa. Dogmatic Treatises ets., transl. into 
Engl. with Prolegomena, Notes and Indices by W. Moore and H.A.Wilson, Grand Repids 1979, 
198; cf. CE Ill, V, 55: 170, 10. Contra the cognitive optimism ofEunomius, the Cappadocians 
asserted that not only the essence of God is unknowable, but as well the essence of any kind of 
creature. Cf. e.g. Greg. Nyss., CE II, 71 -78: 236, 14-239, 1. 
12 Cf. Orig., in Jo. IV, 1, GCS, 98, 2-6. 
13 
CE II, 572 - 576: 376, 8 - 377, 16; 11, 6 1: 233, 6 - 13.; cf. Plat., Epist. VII, 343 a. 
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creator of the world and man, but the latter is entirely the creator of 
language.14 
But what is the objective background of human reasoning? Gregory more 
concretely answers this question . He mentions the existence in our mind of 
some £1tt8EcopouµEvat t:wotat, tf\c: 't'UXT\<; a\.a0rrn\pta or simply v6T\at<; as 
intuitive premises of discursive reasoning. It seems right to connect these 
notions with the first principles of demonstrative science, which belong to the 
intuitive mind (vou~) in Aristotle.15 
While i:nivota and its apriori causes are in potentia present in all men, 
they assume most diverse phonetical shapes in different languages. This is a 
strong argument for Gregory to uphold the conventional character of human 
language.16 In the framework of conventionality of language he does not 
exclude a subjective approach to it; language may differ according to men's 
different conceptions in the same social setting, not only in various people but 
even in various periods of one and a same man's life. The ambivalence of 
human conception and the relativity of language in Gregory's semiotic theory 
is a part of his profoundly dialectical 'Weltgefiihl'.17 It aims to show the 
manifold variety of our world also on the level of human rnivo1a and 
language as an ability of its enunciation. 
Having considered the general features of discursive language in Gregory 
of Nyssa, let us pass on to an examination of Gregory' s views on true 
linguistic expression. 
2. The criteria of truth in discursive language 
Nyssa accepts the point of view of the Greek philosophy of language 
beginning with Plato - which treats nomination in its close connection with 
the categories of truth and falsehood. As Gregory shows Eunomius' statement 
about divine names leads to a number of logical fallacies. He accuses 
14 For Gregory the first inventor of names is Adam, as soon as he gives in Genesis different names 
to the creature. cf. P~ilo, Leg. all., 11 , 14-15. Eunomius asserted the divine origin of nomitation 
through the literal understanding of the expression"God said" in the same book of the Bible; see 
CE II, 402: 329, 6;CE II, 205: 272, 20; 11, 412: 331,19. 
15 According to the definition of brivota in the CE II, 182: 265, 22 conception is a method, which 
adopts through the logical consequence the end of the inquiry with the first presumtion 
(v611crn;). Cf. Plat. , Symp. 209e ff. ; Arist. , Anal. post. , II, 12, 99b 15 ff.; 100b5 ff. See in this 
reference Th. Kobusch, op.cit., 255, 264 (note 43). 
16 CE II, 404-407: 329, 23-330, 11 . II, 545-546: 368, 23-369,2; CE III, V, 50-53 : 168, 18-169, 18. 
Cf. Arist., De lnterpr. 16a 7; 16a 20ff. 
17 For the topic: T. Dolidze, KtVflCJl<;-Begriff der griechischen Philosophie bei Gregor von Nyssa 
in: Gregory of Nyssa. Homilies on the Beatitudes. Proceedings of the Eighth· International 
Colloquium on Gregory of Nyssa, (Paderbom, 14-18 September 1998), ed. R.Drobner, 
A.Viciano, Brill:Leiden, Boston, Koln 2000, 221 -245. 
20 Tina Dolidze 
Eunomius of logical inconsistency, specifically of ignorance of Aristotle's 
syllogistic. For his part, he demolishes his opponent's "spontaneous course of 
reasoning" 18 with the same Aristotelian method of proof, and according to the 
subject's specificity especia11y with his "Categories", 19 though the 
terminological aspect of Aristotle's doctrine is largely neglected. The doctrine 
of so-called antepredicates (homonyms, synomyms, paronyms) and of the 
category of substance are the important "tools" for the defence of true 
nomination. 20 
All of Gregory's numerous amendments in regard to naming are reducible 
to the following requirement of Platonic-Aristotelian origin, which was 
further developed in the Stoic theory of language: nomination of things 
requires to be orientated to things and has to work from the very meaning of 
words, strictly distinguishing their semantic boundaries.21 These criteria are 
opposed to Eunomius' model of discursive language, in which, as Gregory 
remarks, no word has its proper signification: Eunomius confuses the terms 
that express different ideas, and differentiates those that are in natural 
18 See for instance IIl,V, 6: 153,13. III, VIII, 60: 248, 11. 
19 Arist., Cat. la l-4b 19. For the influence of the doctrine of substance in the "Categories" of 
Aristotle on the dogmatic argumentation in Contra Eunomium see B. Pottier, Dieu et le Christ 
selon Gregoire de Nysse, Etude systematique du "Contre Eunome" avec trad. inedite des 
extraits d'Eunome, Bruxelles 1994, 87-95. 
20 I see them to be the main, but not the only means of arguing. The influence seems to be of quite 
complex character. See commentary of J. Dillon on Alcinous' {Albinus') "Handbook of 
Platonism" (Alcinous. The Handbook of Platoni~m. Translated with an Introduction and 
Commentary by J.Dillon, Oxford 1993, 72ff.). 
21 The Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic views about naming seem much closer to each other, than it 
is usually assumed. In this regard it is significant what Alcinous (Albinus) says about Plato's 
view in "Cratylus":"He is enquiring whether names arise from nature or from convention. "His 
view is that the correctness of names is a matter of convention, but not absolutely nor as a result 
of chance, but in such a way that conception arises from the nature of a given thing" (Didasc., 
VI IO; see Alcinous. The Handbook of Platonism, 12). Cf. Plato, Crat. 387d, 388 be, 397a-
422d, 435c-436c. The interpretation of Plato's doctrine in Alcinous resembles very much the 
Aristotelian demand that language must be related to Being, as well as the Stoic Kata 0fotv ~ 
Kata <pucnv combination in the theory of nomination. 
A. Graeser calls Aristoteles the realist in three meanings of this wor<l: he is metaphysic realist 
because he suggests a reality beyond our thought; he is a realist in the theory of knowledge, 
because he conciders that our mind comprehends objectively external reality and he is a 
semiotic realist, because he thinks that our language in some way reflects this reality in 
articulation (See A. Graeser, Aristoteles, in: Klassiker der Sprachphilosophie von Platon bis 
Chomsky, hrsg. von T. Borsche, Miinchen 1996, 37). Gregory of Nyssa may be called a realist 
in the same meanings of word, but it is quite difficult to determine the immediate source of his 
realistic position within the general acknowledgement of the conventionality of language. I 
would tend to disagree with Danielou, who distinguishes the conceptions of Basil and Gregory 
of Nyssa, seeing on the one hand in Basil's view of naming the reception of the Stoic theory 
and on the other hand tracing in Gregory the Presocratic and Aristotelian ideas (see J. 
Danielou, op.cit., 415, 422). 
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affinity.22 Nyssa's critique results in the formation of his own theory of a true 
logical-discursive language. 
I Topic: The nomination must have reference to a thing 
Eunomius issues from the formal contradiction between the names 
generated/ungenerated and concludes from it the diversity of substances.23 
Gregory sees the opposed terms as contradictio in adjecto, hence of the same 
kind as attributes said of substance: "generated" and "ungenerated" are 
contradictories in the meaning of the expressions "is seated"/"is not seated" .24 
Tracing Gregory's way of thinking, we can judge about contradictio in 
subjecto only through names that correspond to the category of substance. In 
this case, when names signify relation, it means the affinity of the designated 
subjects ({moKEiµEVa), because the relation of names is to be concidered in 
subjects (for example the related words "Father" and "Son" manifest the 
natural relation between the subjects). 
II Topic: Nomination must be based on the logical division of notions 
Gregory criticizes Eunomius for his non-logical mode of thinking in 
discussing the transcendent reality. This means that we determine something 
rightly only if we begin from an exact mental classification.25 Gregory argues 
against Eunomius: it is not right to work from the common significance of the 
First Cause as simple and assert that because He is simple He must be also 
ungenerated (i.e. they are not synonyms in the aristotelian sence). Gregory 
requires to specify the semantics of notions: What we call simple is a 
derivative (i .e. paronym) of the notion simplicity, and ungenerated - is 
derived of ungeneracy, and not vice versa.26 Further, in the mental 
classification of reality a proper attribute (distinguishing difference) must be 
distinguished from the name denoting substance. E.g. there must be a logical 
distinction between ungenerated und ungeneracy. Because Father 1s 
22 See for instance CE I, 60 l ff: 190, 20 ff. Cf. the critique of the Neo-arians' language in Gr. of 
Naz., Or. 1-2, 7-8: Barbel 38-40; 48-52. 
23 In such a mode of thinking Eunomius shows himself actually as a nominalist, inasmuch as he 
begins from the formal interrelationship between terms neglecting the relation of signifying 
words to things denoted. But we could not ca11 him of course a nominalist in the common sense 
of this word, so far as Eunomius sees only two members in the process of cognition (name and 
think). Cf. Th. Kobusch. Sein und Sprache. Historische Grundlegung einer Ontologie der 
Sprache, Leiden, New York, Copenhagen, Koln 1987, 53 . 
24 CE II, 17-2 1: 22 I , 26-222, 24. 
25 Cf. Plato, Crat. 338c; 339c. 
26 CE II, 23-34: 223, 8-13. 
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ungenerated, it does not mean that his substance is ungeneracy; as the term 
"ungenerated" is a derivative from the abstract notion "ungeneracy", it is 
indicative of a difference of conceptions, distinguishing that which is 
generated from that which is ungenerated.27 The confusion is basic in 
Eunomius and is the main point in the opposition between him and the 
Cappadocians. One of the private cases of the confusion of terms is related to 
the important topic of the functioning of ordinary and special languages. 
III Topic: Terminological relation of a special language to ordinary 
Nyssa does not apply these technical terms to distinguish two kinds of 
language, but his judgement obviously implies this difference. As he sees, the 
terms of a special language, e.g. theological, stem from lexics of ordinary 
language and correspond to common meanings of words. As a matter of fact, 
the opposition generated/ungenerated, which Eunomius represents as the 
metaphysic ideas in men's mind, are analytic terms borrowed from the 
philosophic language. Gregory states that being alien to the lexical stock of 
the Bible, these opposed terms cannot be identical with the names "Father" 
and "Son"; Eunomius errs in believing that the name "Father" in theological 
usage coincide with the semantic limits of the title "First Cause", hence 
"ungenerated" (i.e. He, Who cannot be generated from another cause).28 The 
conception of "Fathemess" in our mind always has natural intimacy with the 
name "Son"; particularly in theological language it may be connected with the 
name "ungenerated", as long as it implicitly carries this meaning too. 29 Of the 
two significatives of the first person of the Holy Trinity Gregory of Nyssa 
gives preference to the term from the Holy Scripture - firstly because it has a 
connotation with the meaning of the giver of Life, and secondly, because 
"ungenerated" is an ambiguous tenn connoting nonexistence, since 
27 CE II, 23-41 : 223, 8-227, 30; II, 192 ff: 268, 20 ff; II, 506-508: 357, 19-358, 14; III, I 67-72: 24, 
21- 26, 20; III, V, 60: 172, 5. 
28 Eunomius automatically acknowledges here the conventional character of special language. 
29 CE I, 552- 554: 177, 20-178, 17; 559-560: 179, 20-28. Ordinary language must be taken as a 
guide also in relationship between subject and predicate. It is not correct to say: "an action 
follows an actor", as Eunomius says, but the correct expression is: "an actor acts". Eunomius 
actually aimed with the first expression to build a basis for the hierarchal interpretation of 
Divine Hypostases. Through its content and tennonology Eunomius' judgement stays very near 
to Plotin's discource in Enn V 4,2. On his part Gregory aims to show with the reference to the 
common language, that God's creative energy belongs to him and may not be considered as 
something apart from it. 
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nonexisting mythological fantasies, which have been never generated, may be 
denoted with the same word. 30 
IV Topic: The interrelationship of a significative word and context 
Gregory underlines the significance of context as the criterion of true 
nomination, thus testifying once more the relationship of his logic oflanguage 
with Plato and especially Aristotle who systematically investigated the 
problem on the level of a sentence. The smallest types of a context are 
definition and description, being at the same time the most important for 
naming things. Nyssa repeats often that Eunomius while giving a name to a 
thing neglects its definition, which could have prevented him from the main 
error - the confusion of special property and substance, as long as they have 
different definitions. Eunomius could have avoided as well the dogmatic 
blunder that the Son of God may be created, if he had kept in mind the 
description of Him; if the Holy Scripture says of the Son that it is God, Word, 
Life, Light, Image and none of them correspond to the creature, hence he is 
not created. 
The fact of the dependence of simple sign on the context implies also a 
subjective element in Gregory: the relation of the term "ungenerated" to truth 
differs according to who mentions it; the term expresses truth if it is applied 
by him who accepts the orthodox conception of Son-God, that he is not 
created. However, the objective value of the term is for Gregory above all 
contexts: although he admits the term "ungenerated" to be in the catalogue of 
the appropriate attributes of God, he himself does not use it beyond the 
polemic context.31 
V Topic: The equivocation of language 
In the controversy with Eunomius about the nature of nomination Gregory 
develops a very productive idea from the treatment of Aristotle's remark 
30 The example of course aims not only at showing the priority of the title "Father" in comparison 
with "ungenerated", but also to transfer Eunomius' eminent term to the despised bt:iv01a, more 
precisely to its realm of fantasies. 
31 Cf. Basil, Adv Eun. 516D-517A. 
For the lexical relation of the language of Eunomius and Gregory see F. Mann. Das Vokabular 
des Eunomios im Kontext Gregors: El "Contra Eunomium I" En Ia produccion literaria de 
Gregorio de Nisa (VI Coloquio Internacional sobre Gregorio de Nisa), ed. L.F.Mateo-Seco y 
J.L.Bastero, Pamplona 1988, 173-202, specially 189. One of the reproaches to Eunomius is that 
he steals Basil's expression from his context;" drags it from its surrounding body into naked 
isolation." Cf. Basil, Adv Eun. 516D-517 A. 
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about homonyms.32 Along with paronyms and synonyms, Eunomius does not 
distinguish homonyms in his model of language. To Gregory the latter is the 
only way of speaking about the intelligible world.33 This topic concerns the 
hermeneutics of the Bible. Gregory criticizes his opponent for understanding 
the words of the Bible in the common sense.34 When we try to describe the 
divine world of which we are ignorant, because of the limitations of our 
language we apply the same words to it as we commonly use for things of the 
sensible world. Thus the cataphatic and apophatic names of God denote in 
fact human characteristics or other known things;35 through our conceptions 
of Him, we judge which of these attributes may be appropriate or not to the 
nature of Deity. Since the distinguishing properties of human and Divine life 
are entirely different, Gregory states accurately that none of the affinnative 
expressions of God may be extended in the proper sense to Him.36 However, 
the equivocation of language concerning the Divine realm has a cognitive 
faculty in Gregory and hence he gives a concrete method of how to approach 
the transcendent world through the equivocation of our language. This is an 
analogy which results through the abstraction of a known image, i.e. its 
coherent separation from the sensible attributes. 37 As an analogy in Platonic 
tradition it has to do with ascent. 38 We can find many such analogies in 
Gregory, but here I would adduce one of them. 
Gregory argues that to be generated does not imply the divergence of the 
Son from the Father by essence: Adam was made by God and his son Abel 
came into existence by way of generation, but both are men by substance. The 
conclusion may be taken as a guide to the apprehension of the Divine Nature; 
our thought has to shake off all material conceptions from the two mentioned 
32 Arist., Cat. 1 a l. 
33 All analogies which compare the finite existance with the infinity of God is for Gregory 
equivocal. Stead seems not to pay an attantion to this fact, when he critisizes Gregory of Nyssa 
for his inconsistency: "he sometimes argues as if there were an exact analogy between human 
and divine realities, sometimes draws attention to fundamental differences"; see G. C. Stead. 
Why Not Three Gods? The Logic of Gregory of Nyssa's Trinitarian Doctrine, in: Studien zu 
Gregor von Nyssa und der christ]ichen Sp:itantike (V. C. Suppl. XII), ed. H.R.Drobner u. C. 
Klock, Leiden: Brill. 1990,.149-163, see 157. 
34 CE II, 199: 270, 30 : Eunomius has to learn that the Christian is a disciple not of the letter but of 
the spirit. 
35 CE JI, 577 ff: 377, 17; II 551 : 370, 23; II 584-7: 379, 13-380, 16. 
36 CE III, II, 9-10: 51, 4-17; cf. Plot., Enn. VI, 7, 36. 
37 About abstraction (aq><1ipecrn;) in Gregory's theory of language see: A.Th. B6hrn, Theoria. 
Unendlichkeit. Aufstieg. Philosophische Implikationen zu De Vita Moysis von Gregor von 
Nyssa, Leiden /New York/Kliln 1996, 215-222. 
38 Cf. Plat., Rep. VI, 508c. Alcin., Didasc., X, 5. 
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men and, beholding only the idea of relation between them, we would be led 
by the remaining conception to the unapproachable metaphysical realm.39 
One example that Gregory calls "the sublime speech at its height" is also 
to be mentioned - the prologue of John's Gospel:'0 Its language does not 
involve the analogy of sensible with intelligible. The abstract language of 
metaphysics here comes to mind as an immediate analogy. And in accordance 
with this, the question may be raised: could the wording of the prologue be 
really considered the language of philosophy? In spite of the similarity, we 
must say with Gregory of Nyssa - No. The simple justification for this is the 
context - inexplicable, hidden and obscure. According to Gregory it is the 
language of Divine mystery, which is proclaimed by the efflatus of the Holy 
Spirit. It is not a speculative quest that is at work in these words, but a simple 
knowledge of Divine Truth that transcends human utterance. We are already 
in the realm of inspired language: it might be the subject of the logic of 
language only so far as it is submitted to hermeneutics:" 
I have attempted here no more than to outline the main topics of the 
logical interpretation of language in Gregory of Nyssa. Even this brief 
summary points to a quite wide scope for comparative research in the 
direction of Greek philosophical theories of language. Here Aristotle, Plato 
and the Stoics should be emphasized as the main influences, but we can as 
well presume that in these doctrines accepted by Gregory, intermediaries 
must have played their significant role - primarily through the school 
tradition. I think it would not be useless also for a specialist in the modern 
philosophy of language to search for important archetypes in Nyssa's theory 
that found their way into the modem analytic and henneneutic reflexions on 
language. 
39 III, I, 71-79: 26, 6- 27, 25. 
40 Specially I, 1-5. 
41 An example of such translatio is given briefly in Gregory (CE III, II, 16-23: 52, 29-55, 21 ; Ref. 
91 -96: 331, 21 -334, 10), in much more detail in his great Alexandrian master (Orig., in Jo. I, 
16-28, 20, 1-85, 25). 
